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A B S T R A C T
This paper explains why large-scale reform of a civil-law prosecution system will be aban-
doned, fail, or succeed in exceptional cases, focusing on the strategic interaction between
an incumbent president and prosecutors, through a comparative analysis of the South Korea
and Russia cases. A civil-law prosecution system could hardly be reformed, although there
were several attempts to correct the politicization of the prosecution service, in new pres-
idential democracies. An incumbent president sometimes considers major reform against
the prosecutors, but he or she tends to abandon it and seek to form alliance with them,
expecting short-term political beneﬁts under intense political competition. Moreover, al-
though a president strongly pushes for large-scale prosecution service reform, he or she
also cannot easily achieve this goal, since the prosecutors’ willful initiation of criminal pro-
ceedings will cause his or her momentum to decline. Indeed, only Putin exceptionally
succeeded in major reform of the prosecution system under weak political competition,
among South Korean and Russian Presidents after democratization.
Copyright © 2016 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
After the Third Wave of democratization, the rule of law
has been suggested as one of the crucial conditions for dem-
ocratic consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 10). More
recently, the political distortion of criminal justice by pros-
ecutors has also arisen as a serious dilemma, especially in
many young democracies which retain a civil-law prose-
cution system, although this issue has received somewhat
less attention than the judicialization of politics by courts.
In fact, judges could only passively inﬂuence politics through
criminal proceedings because they are able to issue no de-
cision without prosecutors’ indictment. In addition, whether
a politician involved in a scandal would be ex post granted
an acquittal from court is not particularly signiﬁcant inmany
cases, even though it might also play a pivotal role in causing
his or her downfall.
On the other hand, prosecutors can exercise the initia-
tive in undermining a particular politician’s moral
foundations, regardless of courts’ ﬁnal decision, only via pre-
trial criminal proceedings. Yet prosecutors of common-
law countries just decide whether criminal suspects would
be indicted for trials in the decentralized and adversarial
criminal justice system (e.g. the U.S. and England), which
can introduce ‘checks and balances’ between the investi-
gation and prosecution, and therefore induce them to take
their role signiﬁcantly impartially. Although common-law
prosecutors can also be said to have a considerable inﬂu-
ence over pre-trial procedures through plea bargains, at least
the presumption of innocence is seldom damaged (Dammer
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& Albanese, 2014, p. 128). This means that the potential of
political distortion of criminal justice would be relatively
low, because of the due process, in these countries
(Hamilton, 2008). By contrast, prosecutors of civil-law coun-
tries must receive more attention in that they generally
initiate criminal investigations, command police oﬃcers
during the investigations, terminate the criminal cases at
their disposal, and indict the criminal suspects for trials in
the centralized and inquisitorial criminal justice system (e.g.
Germany and Japan). Therefore civil-law prosecutors can ex-
ercise enough power to manipulate pre-trial criminal
proceedings, not only in order to stigmatize a certain po-
litical faction as immoral or criminal suspect, but also to
grant immunity to another (Di Federico, 1995, 1998;
Zannotti, 1995).
However, it cannot be concluded that civil-law prosecu-
tors always have chances to distort criminal proceedings
for political purposes. Under consensual forms of govern-
ment in Continental Europe, a suprapartisan coalition has
been required to select top-ranking judicial oﬃcers
(Ferejohn, Rosenbluth, & Shipan, 2007, p. 734). Moreover,
the composition of an incumbent government unpredictedly
changes when an assembly dissolves, regardless of regular
elections, or when a shift of power occurs within a ruling
party (Linz, 1994, p. 9). Hence, civil-law prosecutors also
tend to exercise their far-reaching power not in favor of a
particular political faction, but in a depoliticized manner,
for their career development. In reality, the political dis-
tortion of criminal justice occurs relatively less often,
despite the civil-law prosecution system, not only in Con-
tinental Europe, but even in some new consensual
democracies (The WJP Rule of Law, 2013). By contrast, in
several young democracies adopting a presidential system,
which gave the president almost exclusive control over
high-ranking prosecutors’ career, along with the Third
Wave of democratization, civil-law prosecutors have a
strong incentive to exercise their extensive power in favor
of an incumbent president during most of his or her ﬁxed
tenure, but to betray him or her at his or her last phase,
for their career progress (Lee, 2014). In practice, Alberto
Fujimori in Peru, Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan, Young-Sam
Kim (YS) and Dae-Jung Kim (DJ) in South Korea, and Boris
Yeltsin in Russia dominated that oﬃce during most of
their tenure but experienced prosecutorial defection at
their ﬁnal phase. In this regard, as the former South
Korean President DJ (Kim, 2011, p. 65) argued, “Currently
the worst cancer in South Korea is the Prosecution
Service … It is excessively subservient to an incumbent
president during his heyday but violently bites him at his
last phase.”
Notably, a civil-law prosecution system could hardly be
reformed, although there were several attempts to correct
the dilemma of the politicized prosecutors, in the new pres-
idential democracies. Accordingly, this article attempts to
explain why large-scale reform of a civil-law prosecution
system will be abandoned, fail, or succeed in exceptional
cases, focusing on the strategic interaction between an in-
cumbent president and prosecutors, through a comparative
empirical analysis of the South Korea and Russia cases. The
selection of these cases has some advantages in explain-
ing the politics of prosecution service reform, while a
number of other young democracies also accompany the dis-
cordant combination of a civil-law prosecution system and
presidentialism. First, the units of analysis that this paper
focuses on are very similar between these two countries.
In fact, South Korea and Russia are so different since they
had come from a typical military-authoritarian and
communist-party regime, respectively. In addition, the
former is a unitary country, while the latter is a federal one.
Nonetheless, South Korea and Russia not only inherited a
strikingly similar formal power and organizational setup in
the prosecution service, but also have the presidential control
on judicial careers in a similar style. The two countries
adopted a presidency with the appointment power over
high-ranking prosecutors, and as Table 1 shows, an ex-
tremely centralized criminal justice system for prosecutors.
Second, almost all variations of the case concerning pros-
ecution service reform could be found across the two
countries. Speciﬁcally, on the one hand, not only South
Korean President YS and DJ, but Russian President Yeltsin
and Vladimir Putin (in his ﬁrst term) also readily aban-
doned large-scale reform of the civil-law prosecution system,
while being satisﬁed only with minor changes. On the other
hand, South Korean President Moo-Hyun Roh and Russian
President Putin (in his second term) unusually did not
abandonmajor reform, but the former eventually failed, and
only the latter exceptionally succeeded in June 2007.
The composition of this article is as follows. The second
section critically reviews the previous literature about ju-
dicial reform, and provides an alternative framework for the
explanation of reform of a civil-law prosecution system in
new presidential democracies. The third and fourth sec-
tions empirically analyze the South Korea and Russia cases
for a comparative explanation of the politics of prosecu-
Table 1
Comparison of prosecution systems in various countries.
Country
Feature U.S. England Germany France Japan South Korea Russia (by 2007)
Power to terminate criminal investigations X X O O Δ O O
Power to control investigative oﬃcers X X O O Δ O O
Investigative force of its own O X X O O O O
Exclusive right to indict criminal suspects X X O X O O O
Discretionary indictment system O O X O O O O
Organizational setup Federal Central Federal Central Central Central Central
O, chosen; X, not chosen; Δ, partly chosen.
Sources: Kim, Suh, Oh, and Ha (2011, p. 146); Mikhailovskaya (1999, pp. 98–104).
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tion service reform. The last section provides the summary
and implications of this article.
2. Previous explanations and an alternative
2.1. Previous explanations
In the literature about judicial reform after the Third
Wave of democratization, ﬁrst, there were explanations fo-
cusing on the exogenous inﬂuences on reform rather than
the endogenous process of it. According to the literature,
the inﬂuence of domestic structures and international forces
was critical in reforming judicial bodies. For example, ju-
dicial reform was attempted with the purpose of
reintegrating judicial bodies into the legal culture of Con-
tinental Europe, in Portugal and Spain, while it was launched
in return for legal and monetary assistance from some in-
ternational forces, including USAID or the World Bank, in
Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America (Santos, 1999,
pp. 54–56). In these new democracies, however, the achieve-
ment of judicial reform was neither homogeneous nor in
proportion to the amount of assistance from the interna-
tional organizations. In addition, these explanations could
not provide an actual dynamic of judicial reform among the
core interested actors, such as political incumbents and ju-
dicial oﬃcers, but only suggest a favorable external condition
for it.
Given the limited ability of the exogenous factors to
explain judicial reform, other approaches seem tomore suit-
ably account for the actual dynamics, focusing on interested
actors’ strategic choice. For instance, Whittington (1998) ex-
plains that a parliamentary majority could delegate
politically divisive issues to independent courts to avoid po-
litical blame, although it is unclear whether politicianswould
actually tie their hands in this way because of the problem
with cooperative delegation. In addition, according to
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), an independent judicia-
ry could be available for parliament to keep the executive
bureaucrats from legislative intents. However, this expla-
nation is also limited in that promoting bureaucratic
performance is often straightforward because of the uniﬁed
government in parliamentary countries and because of the
president’s superiority over the legislature in several new
presidential democracies (O’Donnell, 1994). Furthermore,
overall, the above literature underestimated the incum-
bent governments’ short-term interest in making use of the
judiciary. In practice, an incumbent government has often
exploited judicial oﬃcers’ powers for partisan goals, such
as the removal of its political opponents, in many new de-
mocracies (Maravall, 2003). Especially in the new
democracies with a civil-law prosecution system, a ruling
force is more likely to be tempted to seek its short-term in-
terest in using prosecutors’ extensive power in criminal
procedures for its own ends (Lee, 2014, pp. 87–88).
Nonetheless, obviously, an incumbent government may
sometimes pursue its long-term interest in judicial reform.
Above all, the explanation that a ruling force, when afraid
of losing a forthcoming election, may voluntarily grant in-
stitutional security or judicial review power to the judiciary
for political insurance seems signiﬁcantly persuasive, both
in the abstract and empirically (Finkel, 2005; Ramseyer,
1994). But this explanation still ignores the fact that the
success of the incumbent’s initiative was possible when the
judiciary could also gain considerable beneﬁts, including its
institutional security or judicial review power, from any kind
of judicial reform. By contrast, an incumbent government
can never easily decide to grant civil-law prosecutors such
institutional independence because this reform may allow
them arbitrary power enough to threaten the elected go-
vernment’s own democratic authority (Hamilton, 2008).
Hence, prosecution service reform in civil-law countries
should be deﬁned as decentralizing the concentration of
power over criminal procedures in the prosecution service,
for example, allowing autonomous investigative power for
other agencies such as the police, or the creation of another
body for investigation of high-proﬁle criminal cases.
However, as noted above, a coalition government would
have relatively less incentive to curtail the civil-law pros-
ecutors’ vast power because it can relatively easily make
them preserve political neutrality under the consensual form
of government. By contrast, a presidential governmentwould
sometimes have a long-term interest in reducing the pros-
ecutors’ enormous power, in a totally different situation
where they are loyal to the president during most of his or
her tenure, but betray him or her before and after his or her
retirement, for their own career promotion, as mentioned
above. Then the problem is that the reformist government
would encounter resistance from the powerful prosecu-
tors, as the reform directly infringes on their collective
interests. Therefore, an alternative approach, focusing on the
strategic interaction between an incumbent president and
prosecutors, is required to explain the political dynamic of
prosecution service reform.
2.2. An alternative framework
In presidential democracies, civil-law prosecutors can
enjoy a favorable political opportunity for deﬂecting reform
against them and protecting their powers and position, even
though politicians actually attempt such a change. As dis-
cussed above, an incumbent president will at times pursue
a long-term interest in reform against the prosecutors, par-
ticularly owing to the possibility of their habitual betrayal
before and after his or her retirement. Nonetheless, the pros-
ecutors can easily defeat the president’s reform either by
lobbying or placating the president, given that he or she is
bound to fear political losses resulting from their defec-
tion. In fact, unless the prosecutors guard an incumbent
president, he or she may become the most vulnerable po-
litical actor to the politicization of criminal justice,
considering the probability that the president would be in-
volved in corruption is much higher than for any other
politician (Fish, 2000, p. 189; Weyland, 1998, p. 115). Thus
an incumbent president is likely to abandon prosecution
service reform readily or be satisﬁed only with small
achievements, but to seek his or her short-term interest in
forming alliance with this power agency. In this usual cir-
cumstance, opposition parties would more often have the
long-term interest in prosecution service reform than
the president. Nevertheless, as long as the alliance between
the president and prosecutors is sustained, the opposition
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forces will be persecuted and therefore cannot accom-
plish the reform.
However, if an incumbent president dares to launch
major reform against civil-law prosecutors repeatedly, they
are likely to resist his or her attempts vigorously. This is
clearly a rational option for the prosecutors because the cost
his or her reform would impose on them is heavy, whereas
the effect their resistance could provide is great because of
the political opportunity structure favorable for them. Since
curtailment of the prosecutors’ great powers as preroga-
tives runs sharply against their collective interest, all the
members can be motivated to engage in collective action.
Moreover, the high-ranking prosecutors’ loss, when be-
coming a traitor to their own organization, is no less than
their individual beneﬁt from career advancement in ex-
change for their loyalty to the reformist president. On the
other side, an incumbent president in fact has no way to
protect his or her faction members from the prosecutors’
willful investigation or indictment. In addition, opposi-
tion parties that have pursued to reform the prosecution
system would also reverse their previous position in order
to take advantage of the conﬂict between the president and
prosecutors. That is, they would no longer have a strong in-
centive to support prosecution service reform, given that
political scandals involving the president’s faction are being
intentionally disclosed by the agency. Then vigorous com-
petition among the media to get the ﬁrst reports of political
scandals could also enhance the prosecutors’ political in-
ﬂuence (Jiménez, 1998).
Indeed, this logical development may not spontane-
ously be applied to the prosecutorial reform cases of
consensual parliamentary countries. A coalition govern-
ment relying on parliamentary majority can more easily
make an agreement between various political forces on the
curtailment of extensive power of the prosecution service,
and therefore enforce the agency to abandon its preroga-
tives, while the government would essentially have relatively
less incentive to attempt such a reform, as noted above. By
contrast, an incumbent president would be unable to main-
tain the momentum for large-scale reform against the
prosecutors, encountering their strong resistance, and cor-
respondingly the latter could succeed in protecting their
privileges from the former.
Even in presidential countries, nonetheless, the politi-
cal opportunity enabling the prosecutors to make effective
resistance to a reformist president would be gone, if the pres-
ident becomes no longer vulnerable to the political
manipulation of criminal justice. We can assume that a he-
gemonic party would dominate domestic politics, or a semi-
authoritarian regime would emerge in new democracies.
Then political competition would be signiﬁcantly weak-
ened for quite a while, as Ottaway (2003) pointed out. But
an important point is that even a semi-authoritarian pres-
ident would pursue the long-term interest in curtailing the
power of civil-law prosecutors and consequently in making
them politically impartial, for fear of the time whenever he
or she loses his or her own hegemony, as long as regular
elections are formally held. According to Geddes (1999, pp.
132–133), the more power an authoritarian ruler holds in
his or her hands, the more interests he or she has in un-
dermining any power base for future challengers. Under the
weak political competition in a semi-authoritarian regime,
however, an incumbent president can succeed in the pros-
ecution service reform, differently from the case of
competitive democracies. This is because the president
would become much freer from losing moral foundations
and public support than in competitive electoral democ-
racies, even if the prosecutors intentionally institute criminal
proceedings against his or her faction members. As a con-
sequence, the prosecutors are likely to abandon their
resistance against the president, and correspondingly to
accept even unfavorable changes imposed on them.
3. The South Korea cases
3.1. The President YS and DJ periods
In December 1992, after democratization, YS became the
ﬁrst civilian president in South Korea. But the president’s
power resources were very different from the previous au-
thoritarian leaders’. Under the special conditions of the Cold
War and division of Korea into South and North, the au-
thoritarian presidents often made use of military or
intelligence agencies to suppress their political and social
oppositions coercively. In contrast, a civilian president can
no longer easily exploit these apparatuses to destroy his po-
litical opponents, although the coercive agencies, such as
the National Intelligence Service, still play their roles under
the division of the Korean Peninsula. In addition, Presi-
dent YS voluntarily removed the potential of the
politicization of themilitary, via a sweeping purge of several
incumbent generals, who had long preserved a partisan spirit
through their private networks (Oh, 1999, 133–134).
However, the prosecution service met a more favor-
able political environment than the other coercive agencies
in line with democratization. First of all, the prosecution
service could retain its self-legitimacy relatively easily, in
respect that it was not a mere coercive agency, but one of
judicial bodies required necessarily for the rule of law in
the new democratic period. More importantly, an incum-
bent president would be strongly tempted to use the strong
prosecutors for defeating his or her political opponents,
rather than to launch reform to curtail their powers, given
that he or she could no longer misuse the other coercive
agencies for such partisan goals. In practice, President YS
also frequently used the prosecution service to attack his
political opponents, such as DJ or the founder of Hyundai
Group, Ju-young Jung, but pursued almost no reform against
the agency, despite his other widespread reforms, includ-
ing an institutional change of the judiciary (Hahm & Kim,
1999). This myopic president had to be aware of a long-
term interest in the political neutralization of the prosecution
service at his last phase when his son was prosecuted by
the agency.
It cannot be said that no reform was pursued by others
than the ruling force during the YS era. For example, the
largest opposition party DJ led, the National Congress for
New Politics (NCNP), strongly pursued redistribution of the
investigative responsibility between police oﬃcers and pros-
ecutors via an amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act
(Hankyoreh Sinmun, 12 September 1996). This owed greatly
to the prosecutors’ institution of criminal proceedings against
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the NCNP and the resulting defeat of the party in the par-
liamentary election in April 1996. In July 1997, however, the
NCNP also suddenly decided to suspend its reform plan
before the presidential election in December 1997
(Kyunghyang Shinmun, 24 July 1997). Then, a remarkable
point was the subtle change in the relationship between the
prosecution service and DJ after the NCNP had abandoned
its bill to give the police autonomous investigative power
over some kinds of crimes. Although in October the Grand
National Party (GNP) revealed that DJ might have a massive
hidden fund, prosecutors initiated no criminal proceeding
against him. If the prosecution service had launched a crim-
inal investigation of DJ’s secret fund, he would not have
obtained the presidency, despite his high potential of
winning based on the then serious economic crisis, as well
as the inter-regional electoral coalition between
Chungcheong and Jeolla for him. Hence, it can be ex-
plained that the prosecutors intentionally covered up a
serious suspicion of the leading candidate in the forthcom-
ing presidential election, at the expense of his reservation
of reform against them.
In December 1997, DJ won the presidency, defeating the
GNP candidate, Hoi-chang Lee. As DJ occupied the politi-
cal executive for the ﬁrst time as an opposition party leader,
he aimed at more comprehensive reforms than YS. A
program of large-scale reform of the prosecution system,
which had been suspended for a while before the presi-
dential election, was also included in his reform agendas.
This program aimed to transfer the investigative responsi-
bility for some sorts of criminal offenses from the
prosecution service to new autonomous regional police
oﬃces (Hankyoreh Sinmun, 12 January 1998).
Nevertheless, President DJ’s will to reform the prosecu-
tion service was considerably weakened, mostly owing to
the ‘cloth lobby’ scandal in May 1999. The core of this
scandal was that some current ministers’ wives, including
thewife of theMinister of Justice Tae-Jung Kim (former Pros-
ecutor General), had received expensive clothes as bribes,
and Kim had attempted to cover it up. The GNP even
doubted that the ﬁrst lady might be involved in the bribe
scandal (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 12 June 1999). Nonethe-
less, the prosecution service hastily closed criminal
proceedings of this case. This was possible because the in-
terests of President DJ and the prosecution service coincided
in giving immunity to the people involved in the scandal.
On the one hand, DJ could not help being tarnished by the
wide dissemination of this scandal and correspondingly
having a strategic preference for the earliest termination of
this case. On the other hand, the prosecution service could
not make a thorough investigation into the scandal, owing
to the involvement of the former Prosecutor General and
his wife. If their involvement had come into the open, pros-
ecutors would have been placed in more disadvantageous
position than the police, amid the controversy over whether
the former should transfer a part of the investigatory ini-
tiative to the latter. That is, the ‘cloth lobby’ scandal formed
a political opportunity favorable for prosecutors to have Pres-
ident DJ stand by them. From then on, the prosecution
service consistently served DJ, until indicting his two sons
at the last phase of his tenure. Unsurprisingly, right after
the ‘cloth lobby’ scandal, all the plans for major reform of
the prosecution system were removed from DJ’s program
for judicial reform (Donga Ilbo, 23 December 1999).
3.2. The President Roh period
In December 2002, Roh of the Millennium Democratic
Party (MDP: the new title of NCNP) won the presidency. But
Roh’s victory had rarely been predicted by anyone, even a
year earlier, since he had no experience of leading a major
political force. Roh was rather closely connected to student
movements and labor unions. However, he was gradually
building his image as unusually upright politician, and con-
sequently more and more people, particularly the young,
began to be impressed by him, ahead of the 2002 presi-
dential election. Meanwhile, the MDP adopted American-
style ‘open primaries’ in selecting its presidential candidate,
which also provided an unexpected chance for Roh (Saxer,
2003, pp. 26–27). After winning the candidacy of the MDP
in April, he eventually obtained the presidency, defeating
Hoi-chang Lee of the GNP.
Roh, in his inaugural address, declared fundamental
reform of the coercive agencies (Hankyoreh Sinmun, 22 July
2003). This reﬂected the fact that the new president per-
ceived that these agencies, protecting a small number of
corrupt dominant elites, had been the main cause of po-
litical or social injustices in South Korea. Needless to say,
the prosecution service was chosen as the ﬁrst target, given
that it had been frequently misused for the political dis-
tortion of criminal justice even after democratization. In
particular, the new president himself, who had a career as
human rights lawyer, exactly understood the dangers of in-
appropriately checked civil-law prosecutors (Roh, 2010, pp.
272–274).
However, Roh’s reform could not go smoothly from the
beginning, as prosecutors started to investigate his closest
aides on the charge of collecting illegal political funds for
the 2002 presidential election. Since the scandal increased
and the GNP also furiously denounced, President Roh, whose
moral foundation was his main political resource, had to
overcome this legitimacy crisis as soon as possible. Then,
interestingly, the president urged the prosecution service
to investigate the illegal funding of both the ruling and op-
position parties thoroughly, in order to eradicate the
corruption practice of Korean politics. Considering that Pres-
ident Roh even proclaimed that he would voluntarily resign
if it were proved that his illegal funds had been above one
tenth of Lee’s amount, his intention was to demonstrate his
greater moral credentials. As a result of the prosecutors’
unusual investigation of both the ruling and opposition
forces, it was disclosed that the GNP (about USD 73million)
had collected seven times more illegal political funds than
theMDP (about USD 10million) from businesses (Hankyoreh
Sinmun, 9 March 2004).
However, President Roh was then analyzed as ruining a
chance for prosecution service reform by himself. Roh and
his reformist force could not help losing public trust, even
though they had been proven to be relatively less corrupt
than the GNP. In contrast, prosecutors who had been criti-
cized for their partisan behavior could recover public trust
by “bravely” indicting some of the incumbent president’s
henchmen. Therefore, President Roh’s momentum for
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prosecution service reform was already signiﬁcantly
damaged from the beginning. Regarding this circum-
stance, as the then Minister of Justice Kum-Sil Kang also
testiﬁed, “The Roh government’s reform of the prosecu-
tion service was bound to fail because of the investigation
into the illegal political funds for the 2002 presidential
election…The Presidential Administration became a subject
of the prosecutors’ investigation” (Moon & Kim, 2011, p. 150).
Nevertheless, President Roh did not readily abandon pros-
ecution service reform. In particular, he could unexpectedly
regain impetus for prosecution service reform, since the
MDP, deserting from the president, and the GNP together
passed the legislative decision to impeach him in March
2004. Indeed, national antagonism against his impeach-
ment was quickly constructed, and correspondingly the new
presidential party, Our Open Party (OOP), separating from
the MDP, gained a simple majority in the National Assem-
bly election in April, and ﬁnally the Constitutional Court
dismissed the impeachment bill in May 2004 (Lee, 2005).
In this favorable political situation, Roh introduced a bill for
the creation of an ‘investigative agency against high-
ranking oﬃcials’, aiming to constrain the prosecutors’
exclusive control over high-proﬁle criminal cases.
However, President Roh could not gain cooperation from
the parliament in this time. The OOP hesitated to support
the bill for the ‘investigative agency’, as the prosecution
service was targeting the party. For example, after the in-
troduction of the bill, in February 2005 prosecutors initiated
criminal proceedings against Boo-young Lee, the former
chairman of the OOP, who had strongly supported the cre-
ation of the new agency, on the charge of bribery. Their
investigation into the senior members of the ruling party
seemed to be related to its legislative support for the pre-
sident’s reform (Jugan Hankook, 22 February 2005). The
opposition parties, including the GNP, were also opposed
to this legislation on the grounds that the ‘investigative
agency’ would eventually empower Roh, according to the
bill in which the new agency belongs directly to the pres-
idency. Yet the GNP was understood to seek its short-term
political beneﬁts from the conﬂict between the president
and prosecutors, although the legislation was supposed to
introduce ‘checks and balances’ between the ‘investiga-
tive agency’ and prosecutors, and consequently to give the
opposition party a long-term beneﬁt as well. Anyway, Roh
again lost his chance for prosecution service reform, despite
the unusually favorable political conditions.
As Roh’s tenure went to its later phase, the conﬂict
between the president and prosecutors became aggra-
vated, while the political opportunity favorable for the latter
was strengthened. Ultimately, the Sea Story scandal in
summer 2006 was the ﬁnal blow. A suspicion that there
might be a corrupt deal between the president’s faction and
a slot machine company, Sea Story, through Roh’s nephew
was raised. Regardless of the authenticity of this scandal,
Roh’s moral foundation and popularity were irreversibly
damaged, while the prosecutors’ investigation continued and
the press repeatedly covered the suspicion. Finally, Presi-
dent Roh de facto totally lost his momentum for prosecution
service reform. Therefore, the bill for the foundation of the
‘investigative agency’ was dismissed, not being passed, and
the plan for redistribution of investigative powers in crim-
inal procedures could not even be presented to the
legislature.
Even after Roh’s retirement, his ill-fated relationship with
the prosecution service was not over. After about a year,
prosecutors resumed investigations of the Roh faction, and
subsequently some members were indicted. Roh even re-
corded that “My factionmembers suffered such insults from
prosecutors, because of my failure in reform against them”
(Roh, 2010, pp. 274–275). Although it is not yet clear
whether Roh was really involved in corruption, he eventu-
ally killed himself when the prosecutors’ investigation was
approaching him.
4. The Russia cases
4.1. The President Yeltsin period
Russia managed to begin its turbulent journey to a dem-
ocratic regime, along with President Yeltsin’s overcome of
the ‘August 1991 coup’ as well as the breakup of the USSR
in December 1991. Accordingly, the new president launched
various reforms, particularly economic transformation.
Meanwhile, the popular and elite expectations of state gov-
ernance founded on theWestern concepts of the rule of law
were also raised (Smith, 1996, p. 118; Vinokurov & Baskina,
2012, p. 62). That is, a drastic reform of the judicial bodies
was widely recognized as one of indispensable changes for
a successful democratic transition. Thus, reform of the pros-
ecution service, which held even more power than in other
traditional civil-law countries, could not be an exception.
In late 1991, large-scale reform plans of the prosecu-
tion system were ﬁrst envisaged, both in a draft of new
Constitution, designed by the Minister of Justice Nikolai
Fedorov, and in the Conception of Judicial Reform, written
by some radical jurists, especially the Head of the Depart-
ment for Court Reform of State-Legal Administration (GPU)
Sergei Pashin (Huskey, 1997, p. 327; Smith, 1997, pp.
356–357). Of course the prosecution service did not pas-
sively accept the reform plans. In particular, the then
stalemate between the cabinet headed by Acting Premier
Yegor Gaidar and the parliament, Supreme Soviet, over the
scope and speed of economic reform created a political op-
portunity favorable for prosecutors. As expected, an alliance
between prosecutors and the Supreme Soviet was formed
against the executive, which made President Yeltsin hesi-
tate to support the prosecutorial reformists, despite the social
mood for the reform. In January 1992, taking advantage of
this political opportunity, Prosecutor General Valentin
Stepankov quickly had the parliament pass the new Federal
Law on the Prosecutor’s Oﬃce, preserving most of their pre-
vious powers (Greenberg, 2009, p. 12).
However, President Yeltsin could not yet be regarded as
abandoning prosecution service reform totally, before the
enactment of a new Constitution. Indeed, numerous radical
changes aimed at transformation of the extremely central-
ized prosecution system into a common-law and adversarial
one were again included in a presidential draft of new Con-
stitution (Izvestiia, 30 April 1993). By contrast, the Supreme
Soviet was given a stronger incentive to make alliance with
prosecutors amid its deepening conﬂict with the execu-
tive, and correspondingly opposed to any weakening of
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powers of the prosecution service. In this circumstance, the
prosecution service could conﬁdently initiate criminal pro-
ceedings against Yeltsin’s close allies. State Secretary
Gennady Burbulis and theMinister of Defense Pavel Grachev
were investigated on the charge of illegal sales of military
property to foreign countries on 22 April 1993 (Rossiiskaia
Gazeta, 23 April 1993). The prosecutors’ timing was notable,
considering that the referendum for reevaluation of the pre-
sident’s constitutional power was held on 25 April. Also in
late June, the First Deputy Premier Vladimir Shumeiko and
the Chief of Federal Information Center Mikhail Poltoranin,
among the president faction members, became the target
of prosecutors (Filatov, 1995, pp. 169–171). Hence, in those
days, it seemed hard for the reformists to push for anymajor
change of the prosecution system.
On 4 October 1993, however, the political circum-
stance was completely reversed, since the constitutional
crisis provoked by the violent uprising from supporters of
the Supreme Soviet was coercively resolved by President
Yeltsin, and subsequently the opposition leaders, Supreme
Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice-President Al-
exander Rutskoi, were arrested. Yeltsin could seize all
political initiatives, especially in designing the Constitu-
tion, in one blow. At least at that moment, prosecutors’ fate
also depended on his will. Nonetheless, prosecution service
reform ﬂew in an unexpected direction. First of all, new Pros-
ecutor General Alexei Kazannik strongly advocated the
interests of prosecutors after his appointment. He was even
known to press the president to remove any provision un-
favorable for his own agency from the new Constitution
(Smith, 1996, p. 126). On the other hand, more impor-
tantly, Yeltsin began seeking his short-term interest in
making use of the prosecution service, after the constitu-
tional crisis. He could not easily forget the threat from
prosecutors during his violent conﬂict with the parlia-
ment. In addition, Yeltsin might not yet have predicted the
prosecutors’ defection at the last phase of his tenure, like
the ﬁrst civilian President YS in South Korea. Conﬁrming this
political dynamic, the interests of both sides were precise-
ly reﬂected in the Constitution enacted in December 1993.
For prosecutors, almost all the changes to curtail their pre-
rogative in several drafts were removed from the new
Constitution. On the other side, the president obtained a
stronger control over the prosecution service than previously.
Even after the enactment of the new Constitution in De-
cember 1993, the reformists such as Fedorov and Pashin did
not yet abandon prosecution service reform. They made
efforts to accomplish evenminor changes to reduce the pros-
ecutors’ inﬂuence and increase judges’ authority in criminal
proceedings, through the enactment of a new Criminal Pro-
cedure Code (Solomon, 1995, p. 102). But President Yeltsin,
who had already begun seeking his short-term interest in
using the prosecution service as a political weapon, in-
creasingly required the prosecutors’ backing, because anti-
Yeltsin forces including the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation (CPRF) and Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR)
gained a parliamentary majority in the Duma (the new title
of lower house) in December 1993. That is, the then pres-
ident had little incentive to launch prosecution service
reform. Along with Pashin’s resignation from the head of
the GPU in September 1995, all the prosecution service
reform plans de facto totally ceased (Huskey, 1999, p. 159).
The enactment of new Criminal Procedure Code was also
indeﬁnitely postponed. Instead, Yeltsin was committed to
undermine his political opponents and any critical media,
or cover up corruption involving his factionmembers, relying
on the prosecution service, until being betrayed by the
agency under Prosecutor General Yury Skuratov at his last
phase (Holmes, 1999, p. 78).
4.2. President Putin’s ﬁrst term
In March 2000, Putin obtained the presidency, defeat-
ing Gennady Zyuganov of the CPRF. Accordingly, the process
of prosecution service reformwent into a new phase. Unlike
Yeltsin, Putin had more obvious reasons to pursue prose-
cution service reform. To begin with, he graduated from the
Law Faculty of Leningrad State University in 1975. Also in
the Soviet era, law school students took training courses on
the technical dimensions of criminal law or procedures, as
well as the abstract concepts of due process or human rights
in criminal proceedings (Smith, 2005, p. 181). More impor-
tantly, Putin could clearly perceive his long-term interest
in reform to curtail the enormous power of prosecutors,
since he had closely watched the conﬂict between Presi-
dent Yeltsin and Prosecutor General Skuratov in Yeltsin’s last
year. In actuality, the new president initially tried to choose
a prosecutorial reformer, Dmitry Kozak, as his ﬁrst Prose-
cutor General, although he eventually advanced Acting
Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov to the post, appoint-
ing Kozak to the head of a working group for the preparation
of new Criminal Procedure Code (Mizulina, 2002, p. 16;
Truscott, 2004, p. 190).
The parliamentary compositionwas also changed in favor
of prosecution service reform, after the Duma election in
December 1999. The portion of the conservative commu-
nists and nationalists decreased from about 40 to 25%, and
liberal forces such as the Union of Right Forces occupied no
small share. Therefore, the probability that the Dumawould
support the change of the prosecution system into a more
liberal form became higher than in the Yeltsin period. Fur-
thermore, the pro-Putin party, Unity, not only occupied the
second most seats after the CPRF in the 1999 election, but
also combined itself with Fatherland-all Russia into the ma-
jority ruling party, United Russia, in December 2001.
Therefore, the president’s policies could be strongly sup-
ported by the parliament.
As always, however, the prosecution service began re-
sisting this reform movement. In particular, high-ranking
prosecutors were openly opposed to the reform, by prolif-
ically publishing the logic of their objections in their journal,
Zakonnost’. For instance, the Deputy Head of the Legal Se-
curity Administration V. Bessarabov (2000, pp. 38–39)
argued that prosecutors’ roles in Russia were not much dif-
ferent from those in other civil-law countries such as Japan,
Germany and France. Furthermore, Prosecutor General
Ustinov even emphasized that any change toweaken powers
of the prosecution service would cause an increase in serious
crimes in Russia, via a special report to the Federation
Council (the new name of upper house) (Smith, 2005, pp.
175–177). However, the prosecutors’ objections seemed to
be mostly aimed at protecting their privileges.
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In this situation, it was not easy for President Putin to
push for large-scale reform against the prosecution service.
Although prosecutors did not yet bring criminal proceed-
ing of the Putin faction, the conﬂict itself would be politically
disadvantageous for him in that the opposition parties were
still thriving. Most importantly, Putin began to be tempted
to make use of the prosecution service, since he had already
exploited its enormous power in destroying his political op-
ponents. As is well known, the prosecution service played
a pivotal role in the downfall of two oligarchs who had a
massive media power, Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris
Berezovsky, in 2000. Putin, nevertheless, could not abandon
the enactment of new Criminal Procedure Code, since the
legislation had already been delayed for about 10 years after
democratization. Hence, it could be a strategic option for
him to narrow the scope of prosecution service reform in
the Code. On the other hand, the prosecution service was
also bound to have diﬃculty in delaying further the enact-
ment of the Code, in the situation where a popular president
tried to ratify a new criminal procedure, and the parlia-
ment also agreed with it. Thus it could be a rational strategy
also for prosecutors to minimize the intensity of reform
against them.
The above political dynamic was precisely reﬂected in
the Criminal Procedure Code passed in December 2001. First,
if a suspect’s testimony or other evidence was presented
without his or her lawyer during an investigation, he or she
could repudiate it in court (Art. 75). Moreover, prosecu-
tors’ participation became obligatory in all criminal trials
(Art. 246). Most of all, the Code ruled that courts act mo-
nopolistically in permitting the investigators of law-
enforcement agencies and prosecutors to arrest or detain
a criminal suspect longer than 48 hours (Butler, 2009, pp.
283–287). These changes had an importance in respect that
the immoderate inquisitorial system of the Soviet era was
at last broken, and the pre-trial criminal procedure became
closer to a ‘normal’ one than ever. In Russia, nonetheless,
prosecutors could still control all the pre-trial stages of a
criminal proceeding, and therefore exercise enormously
broad power, as the essence of an extremely centralized
prosecution system remained in the Code. Therefore, this
outcome could be analyzed as satisfying both the prosecu-
tors’ interest in protecting their prerogative and Putin’s
interest in reforming the prosecution service even to a little
extent. However, Putin could be in fact understood as half-
willingly abandoning large-scale reform of the prosecution
system. Instead, he could maintain alliance with prosecu-
tors and therefore use them for attacking his political rivals.
For instance, in late 2003, the prosecution service under
Prosecutor General Ustinov played a crucial role in the down-
fall of the oligarch, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and his oil giant,
Yukos.
4.3. President Putin’s second term
President Putin had consistently concentrated power in
the Kremlin and tightened the control over regional gov-
ernments, political parties, media, and civil society during
his ﬁrst term (Balzer, 2003). In addition, numerous elites
from federal coercive agencies such as Federal Security
Service (FSB), known as siloviki, as well as from St. Peters-
burg, regarded as liberal technocrats, occupiedmost key state
positions (Bremmer & Charap, 2006–2007). Furthermore,
the rapid economic recovery, dependent on ‘oil money’, bol-
stered Putin’s popularity. With the start of his second term
in May 2004, therefore, Putin could build a semi-
authoritarian regime. Since almost all political oppositions
against the president, especially the oligarchs, were de-
stroyed, political competitionwas de facto eliminated, at least
temporarily, in Russia.
In the weak political competition, the prosecution service
was no longer seriously required for Putin to destroy his po-
litical opponents, but he still sought to exploit prosecutors’
power rather than to push for reform against them in order
to manipulate power struggles among the sub-factions
within his semi-authoritarian regime. First, he intention-
ally replaced Prosecutor General Ustinov with Yury Chaika
in June 2006, which meant that the siloviki lost their power
considerably, whereas the liberal technocrats enhanced their
inﬂuence. The corridors of power within the Kremlin were
also regarded as having moved from Igor Sechin, the boss
of the silovikiwho had a kinship with Ustinov, to the leader
of the St. Petersburg technocrats, DmitryMedvedev (Parsons,
2006; Yasmann, 2006).
Immediately after this alteration of power conﬁgura-
tion, new Prosecutor General Chaika squarely targeted the
siloviki by initiating criminal proceedings of a large corrup-
tion scandal, the ThreeWhales case (Burger & Holland, 2008,
pp. 172–173; Taylor, 2011, pp. 173–174). A large furniture
store, Three Whales, was disclosed to have imported con-
traband furniture, and not paid customs equal to USD 5
million, by help of several FSB oﬃcers. As a result, several
senior oﬃcers of the FSB were ﬁred, which signiﬁcantly
weakened the siloviki, given that this clan had their origin
in the FSB (Izvestiia, 14 September 2006). Thus the prose-
cution service was analyzed as exactly serving Putin’s
intention in undermining the political inﬂuence of the
siloviki, although this group still remained as one of pow-
erful clans in the Putin regime (Burger & Holland, 2008, p.
173; Taylor, 2011, p. 174).
However, President Putin still perceived his long-term
interest in prosecution service reform as well, which had
not been actively pursued due to his short-term interest in
the abuse of it. Regarding Putin’s position, as the political
analyst Dmitry Oreshkin commented, “Even though Putin
is himself silovik by background, he understands the dangers
in concentrating power and resources in the hands of any
law-enforcement or security structure” (Whitmore, 2007).
In other words, Putin was obviously recognizing the ne-
cessity of weakening the powers of the prosecution service,
the strongest law-enforcement agency in Russia. In addi-
tion, Putin could have a stronger incentive in curtailing the
prosecutors’ power than before, since almost all of his po-
tential challengers had already been destroyed, and the
power conﬁguration among the sub-factions had also been
rearranged to serve his preference. In this context, the pres-
ident ﬁnally launched prosecution service reform again, more
thoroughly than previously.
In March 2007, it was publicly disclosed that Putin was
preparing a bill for major reform, by which an ‘investiga-
tive committee’ with the monopolistic responsibility for
high-proﬁle criminal cases would be created (Sakwa, 2011,
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p. 191). Until then, prosecutors were optimistic in protect-
ing their prerogative, expecting as always that they would
be able to dominate even the new ‘investigative commit-
tee’ (Vremya Novostei, 17 January 2007). But their conﬁdence
diminished sharply and dissatisfactionwith the reform grew,
after it became known that the reform would deprive the
prosecution service of all of its control over other law-
enforcement agencies, including the new committee itself,
during criminal investigations (Vremya Novostei, 7 June
2007). Then, in comparative perspective, a critical point is
that the prosecutors could not resist Putin, although the
extent of this reformwas more radical than previously. This
was possible because the prosecutors could no longer enjoy
the political opportunity that would have enabled them to
emasculate a reformist president, in the situation where all
the opposition forces, who would have beneﬁted from their
initiation of criminal proceedings of the president forces,
had already been eliminated. That is, the prosecution service
could not have dealt a blow to Putin, even if it had re-
sisted him, in the weak political competition.
In June 2007, consequently, the Federal Law on Adopt-
ing Changes in the Criminal Procedure Code and in the
Federal Law on the Prosecutor’s Oﬃce was ﬁnally enacted
with no alteration from the ﬁrst draft. As the division
between the functions of investigation and prosecution was
introduced, prosecutors lost almost all of their powers during
investigations and retained only the right to indict crimi-
nal suspects for trials, as in an adversarial system of
common-law countries (Ershov, 2010, pp. 15–16). On the
other hand, there was a concern that the ‘investigative com-
mittee’ would ﬁll in the previous political role of the
prosecution service through its investigative power over
high-proﬁle cases. Actually, one Putin loyalist, Aleksandr
Bastrykin, was appointed as the ﬁrst chairman of the ‘in-
vestigative committee’ (Blank, 2008, p. 251). Nonetheless,
it cannot be denied that the danger of political manipula-
tion of criminal justice was signiﬁcantly lowered, considering
that even an incumbent president had to obtain the loyalty
of both prosecutors and investigators simultaneously in order
to achieve this in Russia. In fact, criminal proceedings of
major politicians became slower and less effective than in
previous cases of the president’s political opponents, such
as the Khodorkovsky affair (Sakwa, 2011, pp. 192–193).
Moreover, some examples of the conﬂict between the pros-
ecution service and ‘investigative committee’ have already
been reported (Burger & Holland, 2008, pp. 185–190).
Indeed ‘checks and balances’ could be partly intro-
duced in the Russian criminal justice system. The political
manipulation of criminal justice clearly became a less avail-
able political weapon, even for an incumbent president, even
though Putin may be still able to use pre-criminal proceed-
ings for political ends, by controlling both the prosecution
and investigative agencies under his semi-authoritarian
regime. However, even if Putin leaves political arena and
redemocratization visits Russia whenever, he will be un-
likely to encounter such a threatening attack from
prosecutors loyal to another president because they cannot
exercise power enough to initiate or manipulate criminal
cases. In other words, the prosecution service will no longer
be such a fatal political actor as in Russia and South Korea
after the Third Wave of democratization.
5. Conclusions
In some new democracies, including South Korea and
Russia, prosecutors retained their centralized power, as per-
mitted by the previous undemocratic regime, even after
democratization. Inparticular, as a youngdemocracy adopted
presidentialism, rather than a consensual form of govern-
ment, without careful consideration of whether its
prosecution system follows a civil-law tradition, prosecu-
tors repeatedlydisplayedpartisanbehaviors, concurrentwith
presidential electoral cycles (Lee, 2014). However, a more
serious problem is that, although a political faction includ-
ing a presidential one attempts prosecution service reform
for resolving this dilemma, the faction tends to abandon it
quickly and instead seek to form alliance with the pros-
ecutors, expecting short-term political beneﬁts from
exploiting their vast power. This was demonstrated during
the South Korean President YS and DJ periods, as well as
during the Russian President Yeltsin period and Putin’s ﬁrst
term. In addition, even though an incumbent president
strongly pushes formajor reformof the prosecution system,
he or she also cannot easily achieve this because the pros-
ecutors’ willful initiation of criminal proceedingswill cause
him or her to losemoral credibility and correspondingly his
or her momentum for reform will decline, as exhibited in
the President Roh period. Indeed, among South Korean and
Russian presidents, only Putin could exceptionally succeed
in major reform against prosecutors, in his second term,
because of the de facto absence of political competition.
Therefore, while more empirical research on other coun-
tries would be beneﬁcial, this article implies that a civil-
law or inquisitorial country adopting presidentialism along
with its democratization, “ironically,” may not be success-
ful in correcting the dilemma of the politicization of the
prosecution service until a semi-authoritarian regime
reappears.
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